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BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE:
DESIGNING A TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT FOR
ALABAMA
William H. Holley1
INTRODUCTION
Traditional Indian gaming can trace its roots to centuries preceding the
foundation of the United States. Despite the long history of wagering by Native
peoples, the modern conception of Indian gaming did not emerge until after a
series of Supreme Court decisions rejecting state taxation and civil regulatory
authority over activities conducted by Indian tribes on reservation lands.2 In the
wake of these decisions, tribes began to open gaming facilities on their tribal
lands.3
Indian gaming continued to develop largely independent of state regulation
until Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) in an
attempt to address the issue of unregulated gaming on tribal lands.4 IGRA was
a response to the United State Supreme Court’s decision in California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, which established the proposition that tribes
could conduct gaming on Indian lands without state interference if the State
permitted gaming in any form.5

Associate Articles Editor, Mississippi Law Journal; J.D. Candidate 2017,
University of Mississippi School of Law.
2
See, e.g., McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 181 (1973)
(holding that a state individual income tax was unlawful as applied to reservation
Indians with respect to income derived wholly to reservation sources); Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1973) (holding that the Indian
Reorganization Act barred a state use tax imposed on personalty that the Tribe
purchased out of state and subsequently installed on tribal lands); Bryan v. Itasca
Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 379–81 (1976) (holding that states generally lack regulatory
authority over Indian people on Indian reservations).
3
Seminoles Today, SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA, http://www.semtribe.com/
History/SeminolesToday.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (stating that the first
Indian bingo hall was opened in 1979 by the Seminole Tribe of Florida on its
reservation lands, Seminole Tribe of Fla.).
4
See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2702 (2012).
5
See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214, 221–22
(1987).
1
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The Poarch Band of Creek Indians presently operates three casinos within
Alabama’s external borders: Wind Creek Casino in Escambia County, Creek
Casino in Elmore County, and Creek Casino in Montgomery County.6 All three
casinos are located on lands held in trust by the United States for the benefit of
the Poarch Band—Alabama’s only federally recognized tribe.7 The gaming
activities that take place at these casinos are conducted pursuant to a tribal
ordinance that has been approved by the Chairman of the National Indian
Gaming Commission (NIGC).8 PCI Gaming Authority—a commercial
enterprise wholly owned by the Poarch Band—is tasked with operating the
tribe’s gaming facilities.
Although the Alabama Constitution generally prohibits bingo gaming,
nonprofit entities and private clubs are permitted to operate bingo games for
prizes or money in some towns and counties for charitable, educational, or
other lawful purposes.9 Because some bingo gaming is allowed under Alabama
law and the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission approved
Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth. (PCI I), 15 F. Supp.3d 1161, 1168 (M.D. Ala.
2014) (stating that the lands on which the three casinos are located were taken into
trust in 1984 (Elmore County land), 1992 (Escambia County land), and 1995
(Montgomery County land) respectively).
7
Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgement of the Poarch Band of
Creeks, 49 Fed. Reg. 24083 (June 4, 1984) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 83)
(granting federal recognition to the Poarch Band in 1984).
8
See Letter from Tracie L. Stevens, Chairwoman of the Nat’l Indian Gaming
Comm’n, to Buford L. Rolin, Tribal Chairman, Poarch Band of Creek Indians (July
30, 2010), http://www.nigc.gov/images/uploads/gamingordinances/poarchbandAmdappr07302010.pdf.
9
ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 65 (prohibiting the legislature from authorizing “lotteries
or gift enterprises for any purpose.”);
see also ALA. CODE § 13A–12–27 (1975) (criminalizing the possession of slot
machines or “[a]ny other gambling device, with the intention that it be used in the
advancement of unlawful gambling activity.”);
ALA. CONST. amend. 386 (authorizing “[t]he operation of bingo games for prizes or
money by nonprofit organizations for charitable or educational purposes” in
Jefferson county); Ala. CONST. amend. 387 (Madison County); Ala. CONST.
amend. 413 (authorizing “[t]he operation of bingo games for prizes or money
by . . . nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes”
in Montgomery county); Ala. CONST. amend. 440 (Mobile County); Ala. CONST.
amend. 508 (Calhoun County); Ala. CONST. amend. 542 (St. Clair County); Ala.
CONST. amend. 549 (Walker County); Ala. CONST. amend. 599 (Morgan County);
Ala. CONST. amend. 674 (Lowndes County); Ala. CONST. amend. 692 (Limestone
County); Ala. CONST. amend. 744 (Macon County); Ala. CONST. amend. 506
(authorizing “[t]he operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain
nonprofit organizations for charitable or educational purposes” in Etowah county);
Ala. CONST. amend. 565 (authorizing “[t]he operation of bingo games for prizes or
money by certain nonprofit organizations and certain private clubs for charitable,
educational, or other lawful purposes” in Covington county); Ala. CONST. amend.
569 (Houston County); Ala. CONST. amend. 612 (Russell County); Ala. CONST.
amend. 743 (authorizing “[b]ingo games for prizes or money. . .operated by a
nonprofit organization in Greene county.”).
6
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the the Poarch Band’s ordinance to participate in bingo gaming, the Poarch
Band may operate bingo games at its casinos. Under IGRA, the State is not
required to negotiate a tribal-state compact that would permit the Poarch Band
to offer bingo gaming on its tribal lands.10 However, the Poarch Band may not
operate slot machines at its casinos because Alabama prohibits the operation of
slot machines within its external borders.11
Part I will provide a overview of the classes of tribal gaming governed by
IGRA while also examining IGRA’s provision allowing states to regulate tribal
gaming by agreeing to a tribal-state compact. Part II will turn to jurisprudence
from the Eleventh Circuit barring tribes from utilizing IGRA’s provision
forcing states to enter into tribal-state compacts and foreclosing State regulation
of tribal gaming in the absence of a tribal-state compact. Part III will examine
IGRA’s guidelines for compact provisions, provide examples of provisions
included in successfully negotiated compacts from Florida and Mississippi, and
propose provisions that should be considered when compact negotiations
resume between Alabama and the Poarch Band of Creek Indians.
I. THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT

IGRA was enacted “to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming
by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, selfsufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”12 Through IGRA, Congress
“develop[ed] a comprehensive approach to the controversial subject of
regulating tribal gaming [and] struck a careful balance among federal, state,
and tribal interests.”13 IGRA regulates gaming that occurs on “Indian lands,”
which include “any lands title to which is. . .held in trust by the United States
for the benefit of any Indian tribe. . .and over which an Indian tribe exercises
governmental power.”14

IGRA includes a provision allowing tribes to sue a state for failing to enter into
negotiations for a tribal-state compact. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (2012).
However, the Supreme Court has held that this provision does not provide a cause
of action for a tribe to breach a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that
Congress lacked authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate the
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity).
11
ALA. CODE § 13A–12–27(a)(1) (2015) (criminalizing the possession of slot
machines).
12
25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2012).
13
Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla. (Seminole Tribe II), 181 F.3d 1237, 1247 (11th
Cir. 1999).
14
25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(B) (2012); IGRA defines “Indian lands” to mean (1) “all
lands within the limits of any Indian reservation”; and (2) “any lands title to which
is either held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or
individual or held by any Indian trube or individual subject to restriction by the
United States against alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises
governmental power. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4) (2012).
10
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A. Gaming Classifications Under IGRA
IGRA “divides gaming on Indian lands into three classes. . .and provides a
different regulatory scheme for each class.”15 Class I gaming includes “social
games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming
engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies
or celebrations.”16 “Class I gaming on Indian lands is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the” tribes.17
Class II gaming includes “the game of chance commonly known as bingo”
and permits the use of “electronic, computer, or other technological aids” in
connection with the game.18 Class II gaming is within the jurisdiction of the
tribes, but is subject to IGRA.19 A tribe may engage in, license, or regulate
Class II gaming if the state “permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization or entity (and such gaming is not otherwise specifically
prohibited on Indian lands by Federal law)” and “the governing body of
the. . .tribe adopts an ordinance or resolution which is approved by the
Chairman [of the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC)].”20
Class III gaming includes “all forms of gaming that are not [C]lass I
gaming or [C]lass II gaming,” including slot machines and other casino
games.21 Like Class II gaming, Class III gaming activities are lawful only if
they are authorized by a tribal resolution approved by the Chairman of the
NIGC and “located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization or entity.”22
B. Tribal-State Compacts
IGRA places an additional requirement that Class III gaming may only be
“conducted in conformance with a tribal-state compact entered into by the

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida (Seminole Tribe I), 517 U.S. 44, 48 (1996).
25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (2012).
17
25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (2012).
18
25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(i) (2012); Class II gaming also includes card games that
either (1) “are expressly authorized by the laws of the State, or” (2) “are not
explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State and are played at any location in the
State.” 25 U.S.C § 2703(7)(A)(ii) (2012).
19
25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(2) (2012). The NIGC is charged with monitoring Class II
gaming conducted on Indian lands to ensure that those operations are conducted in
compliance with IGRA. 25 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(1). However, the NIGC is not
authorized to extend its minimum internal control standards to Class III gaming,
see Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 466 F.3d 134, 140
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
20
25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).
21
25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (2012); Seminole Tribe I, 517 U.S. at 48 (1996).
22
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). The NIGC has defined key terms in
IGRA to delineate between Class II and Class III gaming, see infra note 60 and
accompanying text.
15
16
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Indian tribe and the State.”23 It provides that “[a]ny State and any Indian Tribe
may enter into a Tribal-State compact governing gaming activities on the
Indian lands of the Indian tribe,” and that upon receiving a request from a Tribe
“the State shall negotiate . . . in good faith to enter into such a compact.”24 The
United States district courts have jurisdiction over causes of action initiated by
a tribe arising from the failure of a state to enter into compact negotiations with
the tribe or conduct such negotiations in good faith.25
II. TRIBAL GAMING JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Tribes within the Eleventh Circuit have been repeatedly barred from
conducting Class III gaming on tribal lands by state efforts to impede IGRA’s
tribal-state compacting process. Shortly after the passage of IGRA, tribes in
both Alabama and Florida attempted to invoke the IGRA provision allowing a
tribe to sue a state in federal court for failing to enter into negotiations or
failing to negotiate in good faith. However, the United States Supreme Court
invalidated this provision and held that states retained sovereign immunity from
such suits under the Eleventh Amendment.
With the knowledge that tribes could no longer enjoin states into entering
into a tribal-state compact, Alabama and Florida made efforts to regulate tribal
gaming on Indian lands within their respective external borders in the absence
of a tribal-state compact.26 Both states invoked IGRA’s provision allowing a
state to enjoin the operation of Class III gaming activities on tribal lands in the
absence of a tribal state-compact–alleging that the tribes were illegally offering
Class III gaming in violation of state law. However, the Eleventh Circuit has
barred such suits, holding that IGRA does not authorize a state to bring suit
against tribal gaming officials for allegedly conducting Class III gaming on
Indian lands without a compact.
A. Attempts by Tribes to Force States to Enter Into a Tribal-State Compact
IGRA allows a tribe to sue a state after 180 days from the tribe’s request
for the state to enter into negotiations.27 If the district “court finds that the State

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2012).
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A)–(B) (2012).
25
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (2012). (“The United States district courts shall
have jurisdiction over. . . any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising
from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the
purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or conduct
such negotiations in good faith.”).
26
See infra part II(A)–(B).
27
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i) (2012) (“An Indian tribe may initiate a cause of
action described in subparagraph (A)(i) only after the close of the 180-day period
beginning on the date on which the Indian tribe requested the State to enter into
negotiations under paragraph (3)(A).”).
23
24

HOLLEY FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/30/17 2:22 PM

144

[Vol. 7:139

UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL

has failed to negotiate in good faith with the Indian tribe to conclude a TribalState compact governing the conduct of gaming activities,” IGRA authorizes
the court to “order the State and the Indian tribe to conclude such a compact
within a 60-day period.”28 “If a State and an Indian tribe fail to conclude a
compact . . . within the 60-day period,” both the state and the tribe “submit to a
mediator appointed by the court a proposed compact that represents their last
best offer.”29 The mediator’s selection becomes the tribal-state compact if the
state consents to it within 60 days.30 If the state refuses to consent to the
mediator’s selection, the Secretary “prescribe[s], in consultation with the Indian
tribe, procedures . . .under which class III gaming may be conducted on the
Indian lands over which the Indian tribe has jurisdiction.”31
When the Poarch Band invoked IGRA’s compact negotiation procedure in
1990, Alabama entered into negotiations with the tribe. However, the tribe soon
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama, claiming that the state had not negotiated in good faith. The district
court dismissed the suit, holding that (1) Congress had not constitutionally
abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity under IGRA and (2) that the state had
been sued without its consent in violation of the Eleventh Amendment.32 A
year after Poarch I, the district court held that its previous ruling was “equally
applicable” to the state’s official agents when the Poarch Band attempted to sue
the Governor under the doctrine of ex parte Young.33
1. The Supreme Court Strikes Down IGRA’s Provision Allowing Tribes to
Sue States
The issue of “whether Congress successfully abrogated the states’ Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity from suit by enacting [IGRA]” was taken up
on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.34 The
Poarch Band’s appeal of the district court’s prior decisions were consolidated
with a similar case arising out of Florida.35 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
decision of the Southern District of Alabama, holding “states retain their
sovereign immunity and the federal courts do not have subject-matter
jurisdiction over suits brought under IGRA,” concluding that Congress did not
possess the power to abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) (2012).
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) (2012).
30
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi) (2012).
31
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) (2012).
32
Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama (Poarch II), 784 F.Supp. 1549, 1550
(S.D. Ala. 1992) (referencing Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama (Poarch
I), 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991)).
33
Id.
34
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1018 (11th Cir. 1994).
35
Id. at 1018.
28
29
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immunity when enacting IGRA under the Indian Commerce Clause.36
Despite striking down IGRA’s cause-of-action for tribes to sue states that
failed to negotiate in good faith, the Eleventh Circuit authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to enact regulations that would produce a legally-binding
compact when negotiations between a tribe and a state broke down.37 When the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit in 1996, it left
intact the substitute remedy created by the lower court.38
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe, the
Secretary of the Interior promulgated new regulations establishing procedures
that would allow tribes to conduct Class III gaming on tribal lands should a
state invoke its Eleventh Amendment suit.39 When the Poarch Band invoked
the new regulations in March 2006, the Secretary “forwarded the Tribe’s
proposal to the governor and attorney general,” who responded but did not
submit a counterproposal.40
In November 2006, the tribe and the state attended an informal conference
with the Secretary to discuss the scope of gaming allowed under Alabama
law.41 However, before the Secretary could make a final determination
regarding the scope of gaming allowed by the state, the state requested that the
Id. at 1019; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce. . .with the Indian Tribes.”).
37
See Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1018; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3), (7) (2012)
(authorizing the Secretary to “prescribe, in consultation with the Indian tribe,
procedures . . . under which class III gaming may be conducted on the Indian lands
over which the Indian tribe has jurisdiction” in the event that a state invokes its
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit).
38
See Seminole Tribe I, 517 U.S. at 76. The Supreme Court “[did] not here
consider, and [expressed] no opinion upon, that portion of [the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision] that provides a substitute remedy for a tribe bringing suit.” Id. at 76 n. 18.
39
See 25 C.F.R. § 291 (2016). These regulations provide for a tribe to ask the
Secretary to issue Class III gaming procedures if the state successfully invokes its
Eleventh Amendment immunity during IGRA’s compacting process. 25 C.F.R. §
291.3. The regulations also provide information that a tribe’s proposal must
contain. 25 C.F.R. § 291.4. Under the regulations, the Secretary is required to
perform several tasks, including: (1) notifying the tribe whether it meets the
eligibility criteria for invoking the regulations; (2) submitting the proposal to the
state’s governor or attorney general for comment; (3) reviewing the tribe’s
proposal; (4) identifying unresolved issues and areas of disagreement; (5) inviting
the tribe, governor and attorney general to attend an informal conference to resolve
such issues and areas of disagreement.; (6) issuing a final decision. 25 C.F.R. §§
291.6–.8. Should the state submit a counterproposal, the Secretary must appoint a
mediator. 25 C.F.R. § 291.9. The mediator selects between the parties’ last, best
offers. 25 C.F.R. § 291.10. The Secretary may accept or reject for specified
reasons. 25 C.F.R. § 291.11. If the mediator’s selection is rejected, the Secretary is
to prescribe procedures for gaming that comport with the mediator’s selected
version as much as possible, as well as with IGRA and state law. 25 C.F.R. §
291.11.
40
Alabama v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1324 (S.D. Ala. 2008).
41
Id.
36
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Secretary dismiss the Poarch Band’s application in light of a decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit holding that the new
regulations exceeded the Secretary’s statutory authority under IGRA.42
In 2008, “the Secretary issued his preliminary determination on the scope
of gaming in” Alabama, finding that state law permitted “electronic bingo and
parimutuel wagering but [did] not allow non-banked card games.”43 “The
Secretary proposed to resume the informal conference, but the State” filed suit
challenging the new regulations in a United States District Court the next
month.44 Later that year, the Poarch Band intervened in the suit, with both the
tribe and the Secretary moving to dismiss the case.45 The district court agreed
with the reasoning of both the Poarch Band and the Secretary, dismissing the
case as the state’s challenge was not yet ripe.46
B. State Efforts to Regulate Tribal Gaming in the Absence of a Tribal-State
Compact
IGRA expressly provides states with a cause of action “to enjoin a class III
gaming activity located on Indian lands [that is] conducted in violation of any
Tribal-State compact.”47 However, states may not bring such an action under
state law, as the United States has “exclusive jurisdiction over criminal
prosecutions of violations of state gambling laws that are made applicable. . .to
Indian country” under Section 1166 of the Criminal Code.48 Under Section
1166, states do not have “a private, federal right of action to enjoin
uncompacted Class III gaming activity that would violate state laws if
conducted on state lands.”49 Section 1166 merely “creates a body of federal law
for the United States to enforce if it determines that a tribe is engaged in
unlawful Class III gaming on Indian lands that are beyond the reach of state
enforcement authority.”50
In 1996, the State of Florida filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida to enjoin what it alleged to be Class III
gaming operations by the Seminole Tribe of Florida on its reservation lands on

Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 511 (5th Cir. 2007); cert denied sub nom.
Kickapoo Traditional Tribe v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 32 (2008); Alabama, 630 F. Supp.
2d at 1324.
43
Alabama, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 1324.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1331.
47
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2012).
48
18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (2012).
49
Reeves, Mark H., A Rejection of State Efforts to Enforce Gaming Laws on
Indian Lands in the Absence of a Tribal-State Compact, 9 FIU L. REV. 331, 343
(2014).
50
Id. at 343–44.
42
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the grounds that such gaming violated both state and federal law.51 At that time,
Florida had not entered into a tribal-state compact with the tribe. Because the
tribe was not bound under a compact, the district court reasoned that the tribe
had not availed itself of IGRA’s limited abrogation of tribal sovereign
immunity.52 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, preserving “the settled law that
tribes possess sovereign immunity from suit unless they waive such immunity
or it is expressly abrogated by Congress.”53
1. The Eleventh Circuit Affirms Tribal Sovereign Immunity in the Absence
of a Tribal-State Compact
“[T]he Eleventh Circuit’s 1999 Seminole Tribe decision constituted a
resounding rejection of state efforts to control on-reservation tribal gaming
activity in the absence of a tribal-state compact.”54 Florida eventually entered
into a tribal-state compact with the Seminole Tribe in 2010.55 However,
Alabama has sought to avoid entering into a compact with the Poarch Band,
“choosing instead to file suit in an effort to apply state laws to gaming activity
on the Tribe’s trust lands without agreeing to a compact.”56
In 2014, the State of Alabama brought an equity action in state court under
both state nuisance law and IGRA to enjoin gaming at the three casinos owned
by the Poarch Band.57 The action commenced in the Circuit Court of Elmore
County, Alabama, where the state filed a one-count complaint for injunctive
and declaratory relief on the grounds that PCI’s operation of allegedly illegal
slot machines at the three Poarch Band casinos constituted a public nuisance
under Alabama law.58 Because the absence of a tribal-state compact preserved
the tribe’s sovereign immunity and the tribe did not consent to suit, the state
instead named in its complaint PCI Gaming Authority (“the commercial entity
through which the [Poarch Band]” controls its gaming operations), its
members, and the “members . . . of the Poarch Band Tribal Council in their
official capacities.”59
The state alleged in the lawsuit “that the Poarch Band[‘s] casinos offered
illegal class III gaming . . . under the guise of class II gaming,” allowing the
state to sue under Section 1166 of IGRA.60 While the hundreds of machines at
See Seminole Tribe II, 181 F.3d at 1239.
Id. at 1242.
53
Reeves, supra note 49, at 340.
54
Reeves, supra note 49, at 341.
55
See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
56
Reeves, supra note 49, at 331–32; see also Complaint, Alabama v. PCI Gaming
Auth., No. 29–CV–2013–900057.00 (Cir. Ct. Elmore Cnty., Ala., Feb. 19, 2013).
57
PCI I, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1169–70.
58
See ALA. CODE § 6–5–121 (1975) (authorizing Alabama to bring a lawsuit to
abate a public nuisance).
59
PCI I, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1164.
60
Id. at 1167.
51
52
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the tribe’s casinos were billed as electronic bingo games, the state contended
that the devices “play like, look like, sound like, and attract the same class of
customers as acknowledged slot machines.”61 The state also alleged that
machines nearly identical to those operating in the tribe’s casinos were also
being marketed as slot machines.62
PCI removed the action to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama to settle the question of whether the state could enjoin
allegedly illegal gaming at the tribe’s casinos.63 The state made two arguments
as to why state law should apply to the tribe’s casinos.64 Under its first theory,
the state asserted that the “Secretary of the Interior lacked authority to take land
into trust for the Tribe.”65 Under its second theory, the state asserted that “by
incorporating state laws governing gambling into federal law,” Section 1166
created “a right of action for a state to sue in federal court to enforce its laws on
Indian lands.”66
“The district court rejected [the state’s] arguments and dismissed the action
on the grounds that the [tribe was] entitled to [sovereign] immunity on nearly
all of Alabama’s claims.”67 The state appealed the decision to the Eleventh
Circuit.68 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss
the state’s claims, concluding that (1) both PCI and its members were entitled

Alabama v. PCI Gaming Authority (PCI II), 801 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir.
2015). The NIGC has adopted regulations that define key terms in order to
delineate between Class II electronic bingo and Class III gaming. 67 Fed. Reg.
41166 (June 17, 2002). The regulations define “electronic, computer or other
technological aid” as any device that (1) “[a]ssists a player or the playing of a
game;” (2) “[i]s not an electronic or electromechanical facsimile;” and (3) “[i]s
operated in accordance with applicable Federal communications law.” 25 C.F.R. §
502.7(a).
Under the regulations, these include, but are not limited to devices that (1)
“[b]roaden the participation levels in a common game;” (2) “[f]acilitate
communication between and among gaming sites;” or (3) “[a]llow a player to play
a game with or against other players rather than with or against a machine.” 25
C.F.R. § 502.7(b). In the context of bingo, the regulations define “electronic or
electromechanical facsimile” as “a game played in an electronic or
electromechanical format that. . . broadens participation by allowing multiple
players to play with or against each other rather than with or against a machine.” 25
C.F.R. § 502.8. “Other games similar to bingo” are defined under the regulations as
“any game played in the same location as bingo (as defined in [IGRA]) constituting
a variant on the game of bingo, provided that such game is not house banked and
permits players to compete against each other for a common prize or prizes.” 25
C.F.R. § 502.9.
62
PCI II, 801 F.3d at 1285.
63
PCI I, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1164–65.
64
PCI II, 801 F.3d at 1282.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. (referencing PCI I, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1191).
68
Id.
61
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to sovereign immunity and (2) section 1166 gave no right of action for the state
to sue.69
III. DESIGNING A TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT FOR ALABAMA
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in PCI Gaming “should mark the last gasp
of state efforts to control tribal gaming on Indian lands in the absence of a
tribal-state compact, at least in the states encompassed within the Eleventh
Circuit.”70 PCI Gaming “unequivocally establishes that, outside the context of a
mutually agreed-upon compact, Congress intended” to leave the regulation of
tribal gaming and enforcement of IGRA on tribal lands within the exclusive
purview of gaming tribes and the federal government.71 The Eleventh Circuit’s
ruling in PCI Gaming effectively forecloses any future efforts by the state of
Alabama to regulate tribal gaming on tribal lands within its borders in the
absence of a tribal-state compact. Thus, for the state to gain any oversight of
the Poarch Band’s gaming operations, it must resume compact negotiations
with the tribe.
A. IGRA’s Guidelines for Compact Provisions
IGRA contains a list of provisions that may be included in a tribal-state
compact. Under IGRA, a tribal-state compact may include provisions affecting:
(1) the application of tribal and state criminal and civil laws and regulations
“directly related to, and necessary for, the licensing and regulation” of gaming;
(2) “the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the state and the
Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations;” (3)
payments assessed by the state “in such amounts as are necessary to defray the
costs of regulat[ion];” (4) “taxation by the Indian tribe of [gaming] in amounts
comparable to amounts assessed by the State for comparable activities”; (5)
“remedies for breach of contract;” (6) “standards for the operation of [gaming]
and maintenance of the gaming facility, including licensing; and” (7) “any
other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming activities.”72
The content of provisions following these guidelines among successfully
negotiated tribal-state compacts vary widely.73 Terms in tribal-state compacts
Id. at 1300.
Reeves, supra note 49, at 342.
71
Id.
72
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C) (2012).
73
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 12.05[2], at 890 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
69
70

“[M]any compacts currently in effect have provisions that deal with tribal and state licensing
and certification for employees; tribal and state enforcement of compact provisions;
allocation of civil, regulatory, and criminal jurisdiction and law enforcement; the tribe’s
sovereign immunity and whether or to what extent it is waived for gaming activities; size of
gaming operations; which games are authorized; technical requirements of electronic gaming
devices; state inspection, testing, and approval of gaming devices and facilities; tribal
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often set the duration of the compact.74 When no duration is set, “the compact
is presumed to run indefinitely and neither party may unilaterally terminate a
compact.”75
IGRA provides that states may not insist upon any terms that “impose any
tax, fee, charge, or other assessment upon an Indian tribe.”76 This section also
provides that “[n]o [s]tate may refuse to enter into [compact] negotiations . . .
based upon the [state’s] lack of authority . . . to impose such a tax, fee, charge,
or other assessment.”77 However, IGRA’s express prohibition on terms that
impose a tax or fee on tribal gaming does not forbid provisions that allow the
reimbursement of the costs incurred by the state in regulating tribal gaming.78
Thus, states may insist upon “compact provisions calling for assessments by the
State to defray its additional regulatory costs.”79
IGRA also places restrictions prohibiting tribes from using net revenues
from gaming operations for any “purposes other than . . . funding tribal
government operations or programs; promot[ing] tribal economic development;
[donating] to charitable organizations;” or helping fund local government
agencies’ operations.80 Despite these limitations, IGRA permits tribes to
“distribute per capita payments . . . from net gaming revenues in accordance
with tribal revenue allocations plans approved by the Secretary of the Interior if
certain conditions are met.”81
payment of state regulatory costs; casino security and monitoring; tribal and state reciprocal
access to records and reports; alcohol regulation; day-to-day rules of operation; conditions
for amendments; and intrastate parity of gaming operations among tribes.”

Id.
Id. at 890–91. For example, Florida’s tribal state with the Seminole Tribe of
Florida is designed to remain in effect for a term of 20 years. See infra note 98 and
accompanying text.
75
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 891. For example, Mississippi’s tribalstate compact with the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians contains no such
terms, meaning that the compact will remain in effect for indefinitely “until
terminated by mutual consent of the parties.” TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT FOR
REGULATION OF CLASS III GAMING ON THE MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW
INDIANS RESERVATION IN MISSISSIPPI, § 15.2, 39 (Dec. 4, 1992),
http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/xoig/documents/text/idc-038317.pdf
[hereinafter CHOCTAW COMPACT].
76
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4) (2012).
77
Id.
78
See generally, id.
79
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 891.
80
25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2012).
81
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–15–355, INDIAN GAMING:
REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT BY THE FED. GOV’T, STATES, & TRIBES (June 2015)
at 6 n.17. IGRA allows tribal gaming revenues to “be used to make per capita
payments” to tribal members only if: (1) “the Indian tribe has prepared a plan to
allocate revenues to uses authorized by [IGRA];” (2) “the plan is approved by the
Secretary as adequate;” (3) “the interests of minors and other legally incompetent
persons who are entitled to receive any of the per capita payments are protected and
preserved and the per capita payments are disbursed to the parents or legal guardian
74
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1. Revenue-Sharing Agreements Under IGRA
Revenue-sharing agreements requiring payments by tribes directly to the
state have been approved by the Secretary of the Interior “on the ground that
those payments are not taxes, but exchanges of cash for significant economic
value conferred by the exclusive or substantially exclusive right to conduct
gaming in the state.”82 Under many revenue-sharing agreements, “a tribe
commits to paying a portion of its gaming revenues to the state in exchange for
the [exclusive] right to conduct [Class III] gaming in the state.”83 Revenuesharing provisions that include promises of exclusivity have become prevalent
in successfully negotiated tribal-state compacts.84
Revenue-sharing provisions fall into two general categories. The vast
majority of revenue-sharing provisions require the tribe to pay the state an
increasing percentage as gaming revenues increase.85 However, the percentage
of revenues shared are often capped at the maximum payment agreed upon in
the revenue-sharing agreement.86 Far fewer tribal-state compacts require a tribe
to pay the state a fixed amount or a flat percentage of all gaming revenues.87
B. Examples of Tribal-State Compacts From Adjacent States
Both Mississippi and Florida have successfully negotiated tribal-state
compacts regulating Class III gaming operations within their respective
borders. Like Alabama, Mississippi is home to only one federally recognized
tribe (the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians).88 Florida is home to two
federally recognized tribes (the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida and the
Seminole Tribe of Florida) but has only agreed to a tribal-state compact with

of such [persons] in such amounts as may be necessary for the health, education, or
welfare, of [that person] under a plan approved by the Secretary and the governing
body of the Indian tribe; and” (4) “the per capita payments are subject to Federal
taxation and tribes notify members of such tax liability when payments are made.”
25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3) (2012).
82
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 891.
83
STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT & KATHRYN R.L. RAND, INDIAN GAMING AND TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COMPROMISE 70 (2005).
84
Id. 169 of 276 (61 percent) “of all compacts in effect as of [2014] contained
revenue sharing provisions between the tribes and states.” U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 81, at 18.
85
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 81, at 18 (noting that 164
tribal-state compacts in effect as of October 2014 involved tribal “payments [to the
state] tied to gaming revenues and include[d] a maximum payment.”
86
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 81, at 18.
87
Id. (Only five compacts in effect as of 2014 required a tribe pay a fixed amount
or a flat percentage of all gaming revenues to the state).
88
Federal and State Recognized Tribes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/state-tribal-institute/list-of-federal-and-staterecognized-tribes.aspx#ms (last updated Oct. 2016).
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one.89
Mississippi has elected to take a limited regulatory role over tribal gaming,
leaving the primary responsibility of monitoring gaming on tribal lands to the
tribe itself.90 Florida has taken a more active role in regulating tribal gaming,
with the state maintaining a regular presence at gaming facilities.91 Florida has
a revenue-sharing agreement with the Seminole Tribe of Florida, while
Mississippi generally does not receive payments tied to tribal gaming
revenue.92 An analysis of both tribal-state compacts demonstrates two very
different approaches to negotiating a successful tribal-state compact.
1. The ‘Hands-Off’ Approach: Mississippi’s Tribal-State Compact with the
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
Mississippi’s tribal-state compact with the Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians received Secretarial approval in 1993.93 Mississippi’s compact remains
in effect for an indefinite term “until terminated by mutual consent of the
parties.”94 The scope of gaming allowed under Mississippi’s compact extends
to virtually all Class III gaming permitted under IGRA.95
For the purposes of regulating Class III gaming on tribal lands,
Mississippi’s tribal-state compact confers: (1) “exclusive criminal and civil
jurisdiction over Tribal members. . .to the extent allowed by federal law” to the
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians; (2) concurrent civil jurisdiction to both
the state and the tribe over the Class III gaming activities occurring on tribal
lands; and (3) “exclusive criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians” to the state.96
The compact also provides that the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians “shall
maintain its own security force which will have primary law enforcement
See id.; see also Gaming Compacts, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INDIAN
AFFAIRS,
https://www.indianaffairs.gov/WhoWeAre/ASIA/OIG/Compacts/index.htm#Florida (last updated Apr. 3, 2017).
90
See infra Section (III)(B)(1).
91
See infra Section (III)(B)(2).
92
See infra Sections (III)(B)(1)–(2).
93
Indian Gaming; Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 58 Fed. Reg. 6600 (Jan.
29, 1993).
94
CHOCTAW COMPACT, supra note 75, at 39.
95
Mississippi’s tribal-state compact authorizes the Tribe to operate “any game
played with cards, dice, equipment or any mechanical or electronic device or
machine for money, property, checks, credit or any representative of value,
including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, faro, monte, roulette,
keno, bingo, fan-tan, twenty-one, blackjack, seven-and-a-half, big injun, klondike,
craps, poker, chuck-a-luck, chinese chuck-a-luck (dai shu), wheel of fortune,
chemin de fer, baccarat, pai gow, beat the banker, panguingui, slot machine, and
any other banking or percentage game.” CHOCTAW COMPACT, supra note 75, at 6–
7. Mississippi’s tribal-state compact also authorizes the Tribe to conduct
“parimutuel wagering, race book and sport pools. . .only if such games are allowed
under the laws of the State.” CHOCTAW COMPACT, supra note 75, at 7.
96
CHOCTAW COMPACT, supra note 75, at 12.
89
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responsibilities on the premise[s]” of the tribe’s Class III gaming facility.97
Mississippi’s tribal-state compact delegates “[t]he primary responsibility
for the on-site regulation, control and security” of the tribe’s Class III gaming
operations to the Choctaw Gaming Commission—the tribe’s independent
regulatory entity.98 However, the terms of the compact delegate the Mississippi
Gaming Commission some authority to oversee tribal gaming. For example,
[a]gents of the Mississippi Gaming Commission . . . upon the presentation of
appropriate identification to the on-site Choctaw Gaming Commission
official . . . have the right to gain access, without notice during normal
business hours, to all premises used for the operation of Class III Gaming or
the storage of Class III Gaming equipment . . . and may inspect the Casino
premises, equipment, or equipment maintenance records in order to verify
99
compliance with the provisions of [the] compact.

The Choctaw Gaming Commission must also “forward copies of all
completed investigation reports and final dispositions to the Mississippi
Gaming Commission on a continuing basis.”100
Although Mississippi’s tribal-state compact does not include a revenuesharing provision, the tribe and the state may “mutually agree upon a budget for
necessary and actual expenses that may be reasonably incurred by the State
during the calendar year in connection with Class III gaming activities.”101
Under the compact, additional payments to the state are required if the state
designates tribal lands as a ‘State Tourism Council Area,’ in which case “the
Tribe and the State shall separately provide $250,000 each year in matching
funds to be used for advertising and promotion of tourism.”102
Mississippi’s tribal-state compact is extraordinarily deferential to the tribe
in terms of the regulatory oversight of the tribe’s gaming operations. The
Compact’s indefinite term leaves the state with few options to negotiate with
the tribe in light of developments regarding the Interior Department’s rules
governing revenue-sharing agreements. However, despite its shortcomings in
terms of the state’s ability to demand payments derived from tribal gaming
revenues, Mississippi’s compact places a light burden on the state in regulating
tribal gaming.
Id.
CHOCTAW COMPACT, supra note 75, at 13–14.
99
CHOCTAW COMPACT, supra note 75, at 17–18.
100
CHOCTAW COMPACT, supra note 75, at 15.
101
CHOCTAW COMPACT, supra note 75, at 33–34. These expenses include, but are
not limited to:
97
98

(i) oversight and enforcement actions as provided for under this Compact, (ii) additional
manpower and equipment required by the Department of Public Safety due to increased
traffic control on State highways leading to a Casino, and (iii) costs in making any necessary
improvement to an intersection of a State highway with a Bureau of Indian Affairs or Tribal
road leading to a Tribal Casino as a result of increased traffic due to Class III gaming
activities and utilizing government grants and road funds.
CHOCTAW COMPACT, supra note 75, at 33–34.
102
CHOCTAW COMPACT, supra note 75, at 34.
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2. The ‘Hands-On Approach’: Florida’s Tribal-State Compact With the
Seminole Tribe of Florida
Florida’s tribal-state gaming compact with the Seminole Tribe of Florida
received secretarial approval in 2010.103 It authorizes the tribe to offer gaming
at seven of the tribe’s gaming facilities and is effective for a term of 20
years.104 The compact does not purport to “alter tribal, federal or state
adjudicatory or criminal jurisdiction in any way” because “[t]he obligations and
rights of the state and the tribe under [the] Compact are contractual in
nature.”105
Florida’s tribal-state compact restricts the tribe’s ability to conduct Class
III gaming to only those games covered under the compact.106 The Class III
games covered under the the compact include: (1) slot machines (excluding slot
machines that accept payment by credit or debit card); (2) “[b]anking or banked
card games, including baccarat, chemin de fer, and blackjack;” (3) “[r]affles
and drawings;” and (4) “[a]ny new game authorized by Florida law for any
person for any purpose . . . [excluding] banked card games authorized for any
other federally recognized tribe pursuant to [IGRA].”107

Indian Gaming, 75 Fed. Reg. 38833 (July 6, 2010). Florida’s current tribal-state
gaming compact with the Seminole Tribe replaces an unsuccessfully negotiated
compact that was deemed approved by the Secretary of the Interior in 2008. See
Indian Gaming, 73 Fed. Reg. 1229 (Jan. 7, 2008); see also COMPACT BETWEEN THE
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA AND THE STATE OF FLORIDA (Nov. 14, 2007),
http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/xoig/documents/text/idc1-026001.pdf
[hereinafter SEMINOLE COMPACT].
104
SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 103, at 13, 49 (Apr. 7, 2010). The seven
tribally-owned casinos authorized under the compact include: Seminole Indian
Casino–Brighton, Seminole Indian Casino–Coconut Creek, Seminole Indian
Casino–Hollywood, Seminole Indian Casino–Immokalee, Seminole Indian Casino–
Big Cypress, Seminole Hard Rock Hotel & Casino–Hollywood, and Seminole Hard
Rock Hotel & Casino–Tampa.
105
SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 103, at 31.
106
SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 103, at 3. Florida’s tribal state compact
expressly prohibits the Tribe from offering “roulette, craps, roulette-styled games,
or craps styled games” but does not “prohibit the Tribe from operating slot
machines that employ video and/or mechanical displays of roulette, wheels or other
table game themes.” SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 102, at 12.
107
SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 103, at 3–4. (Defining “Slot machines,” as
“any mechanical or electrical contrivance, terminal that may or may not be capable
of downloading slot games from a central server system, machine, or other device
that, upon insertion of a coin, bill, ticket, token, or similar object or upon payment
of any consideration whatsoever, including the use of any electronic payment
system, except a credit card or debit card, is available to play or operate . . .
whether by reason of skill or application of the element of chance . . . may deliver
or entitle the person . . . playing or operating the . . . machine . . . to receive cash,
103
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Under Florida’s tribal-state compact, the state and the tribe concurrently
share the responsibility to regulate gaming on tribal lands.108 The tribe’s
regulatory responsibilities under the compact are fulfilled by the Seminole
Tribal Gaming Commission—the tribe’s independent regulatory agency.109 The
state’s regulatory responsibilities are delegated to the State Compliance Agency
(SCA).110 Officers of the Commission are required under the compact to “be
available to the [tribe’s facilities] during all hours of operation upon reasonable
notice” and are authorized to “have immediate access to any and all areas of the
[tribe’s facilities] for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the provisions of
[this] compact.”111 However, officers of the Commission are required to answer
to the SCA regarding any potential violations of the terms of the Compact.112
Despite granting the tribe the authority to regulate its own gaming
activities, the state reserves the right under the compact “to conduct random
inspections as provided for in this Part to assure that the tribe is operating in
accordance with the terms of the Compact.”113 In order to fulfill the state’s
oversight responsibility, agents of the SCA are required to “have reasonable

billets, tickets, tokens, or electronic credits to be exchanged for cash or to receive
merchandise or anything of value whatsoever, whether the payoff is made
automatically from the machine or manually.”).
Despite its prohibition on the use of slot machines that accept payment by
credit or debit card, Florida’s tribal-state compact authorizes the Tribe to use such
machines if Florida state law allows. SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 103, at 4.
Although Florida’s tribal-state compact permits the Tribe to offer banked card
games, the compact forbids it from doing so “at [the Tribe’s] Brighton or Big
Cypress Facilities unless . . . [the State] permits any other person, organization or
entity to offer such games.” SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 103, at 4.
108
SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 103, at 23.
109
SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 103, at 3, 24 (requiring that officers of the
Seminole Tribal Gaming Commission “be independent of the Tribal gaming
operations, and shall be supervised by and accountable only to the Commission.”).
110
SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 103, at 12.
111
SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 103, at 24.
112
See SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 103, at 24. (requiring the Seminole Tribal
Gaming Commission to “investigate any suspected or reported violation of [the
compact] and shall officially enter into its files timely written reports of
investigations and any action taken thereon.” The compact requires the
Commission to forward copies of their investigative reports to the SCA within 30
days).
113
SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 103, at 25. (This includes the authority of the
State to demand “an annual independent audit of the conduct of Covered Games
subject to [the] Compact.”). Random inspections of tribal gaming facilities by the
SCA are limited to “one . . . inspection per Facility per calendar month . . . and . . .
not more than ten . . . hours spread over two . . . consecutive days.” SEMINOLE
COMPACT, supra note 103, at 27. The compact sets an annual limit of 1,200 hours
for all random inspections and audit reviews of tribal gaming facilities by the SCA.
SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 103, at 27. The compact also limits the SCA to
one review per year of the Tribe’s slot machine compliance audit. SEMINOLE
COMPACT, supra note 103, at 28.
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access to all public areas of the [tribe’s] [f]acilities related to the conduct of
[games covered under the compact].”114 However,
[a]t the completion of any SCA inspection or investigation, the SCA [must]
forward any written report . . . to the Commission, containing all pertinent,
non-confidential, non-proprietary information regarding any violation of
applicable laws or [the] Compact . . . unless disclosure . . . would adversely
115
impact an investigation of suspected criminal activity.

The Compact requires the tribe to reimburse the state annually “for the
actual and reasonable costs of the [SCA] to perform its monitoring
functions.”116
In exchange for “partial but substantial exclusivity,” Florida’s tribal-state
compact requires the tribe to pay the state a share of its net winnings derived
from the tribe’s Class III gaming operations.117 To facilitate this, the compact’s
revenue-sharing agreement requires the tribe to convert all of its Class II video
bingo terminals to Class III slot machines within 60 months from January 1,
2008.118 The revenue-share that the tribe pays to the state is calculated
according to a ‘Revenue Sharing Cycle.’119 For the first 24 calendar months
from the effective date of the compact, the tribe is required to pay $12,500,000
per month.120 The first revenue sharing cycle commences after 24 months have
passed from the effective date and terminates after one year.121 Each successive
revenue-sharing cycle lasts a term of 12 months.122 For the first three Revenue
Sharing Cycles, the tribe is required to pay the state the greater of the
‘Guaranteed Minimum Revenue Sharing Cycle Payment’ or an amount equal to
the ‘Percentage Revenue Share Amount’ calculated under the compact.123 After

SEMINOLE COMPACT, supra note 103, at 26. The compact only allows SCA
agents to access the Tribe’s gaming facilities during operating hours. Id. at 29.
When SCA inspection of the facility is limited only to public areas,
“representatives of the SCA [must] provide notice and photographic identification
to the Commission of their presence before beginning any such inspections.” Id.
When SCA inspection of the facility includes nonpublic areas, SCA agents must
“provide one . . . hour notice . . . to the Commission and. . . . [must] be
accompanied in nonpublic areas of the Facility by a Commission officer.” Id.
115
Id. at 30.
116
Id. at 2. Under Florida’s tribal-state compact, the State’s ‘Annual Oversight
Assessment’ is not to exceed $250,000 per year. Id. at 38.
117
Id. at 31–32.
118
Id. at 32.
119
Id. at 12, 24.
120
See generally Id. at 9, 32–33.
121
Id. at 12.
122
See id.
123
Id. at 7, 33 (the ‘Guaranteed Minimum Revenue Sharing Cycle Payment’ as
calculated under Florida’s tribal-state compact requires the tribe to pay
$150,000,000 in each of the two years of the Initial Period; a minimum payment of
$233,000,000 for each of the first and second revenue-sharing cycles; and
$234,000,000 for the third revenue-sharing cycle).
114

HOLLEY FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2017]

BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE

5/30/17 2:22 PM

157

the third revenue-sharing cycle, the tribe must pay the state the ‘Percentage
Revenue Share Amount.124 The total revenue-share payments for the first five
years of the compact must total at least $1,000,000,000.125
Florida’s tribal-state compact places significant restrictions on the conduct
of tribal gaming in the state. This particular compact exemplifies the extent to
which a state can regulate tribal gaming, (including Class II gaming) under a
valid compact. In exchange for a promise of exclusivity, the state was able to
secure an enormous share of the tribe’s gaming revenue. The state has also
required the tribe to reimburse the costs of state regulation, greatly reducing the
state’s financial burden.
C. Drafting a Tribal-State Compact for Alabama
As recently as 2015, the Poarch Band offered to pay $250,000,000 to the
state in return for the exclusive right to conduct Class III gaming in the state.126
This offer prompted legislative leaders in the state to “recommend an
agreement with the [tribe] as a key part of [their] plan to close a budget
shortfall estimated at $200 million” for fiscal year 2016.127 Discussions held
between the Poarch Band’s tribal council and state legislators indicated that a
proposed compact between the tribe and the state would require the tribe “to
pay the state a percentage of earnings each year.”128
A cursory analysis of the tribe’s gaming revenues and other holdings
Id. at 33–34 (the ‘Percentage Revenue Share Amount’ as calculated under
Florida’s tribal-state compact requires the Tribe to pay 12% of all amounts up to
$2,000,000,000 of net winnings; 15% of all amounts between $2,000,000,000 and
$3,000,000,000; 17.5% of all amounts between $3,000,000,000 and
$3,500,000,000; 20% of all amounts between $3,500,000,000 and $4,000,000,000;
22.5% of all amounts between $4,000,000,000 and $4,500,000,000; and 25% of all
amounts greater than $4,500,000,000).
125
Id. at 7, 38 (the Tribe is also required to “make an annual donation to the
Florida Council on Compulsive Gaming as an assignee of the State in an amount
not less than. . .$250,000.00 per Facility.”).
126
Josh Moon & Brian Lyman, Poarch Creeks Offer Alabama $250M Budget
Bailout, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Apr. 29, 2015, 7:05 AM),
http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/2015/04/28/poarch-creeksoffer-bail-state/26548581/ (stating Alabama Senate President Pro Tem Del Marsh
(R-Anniston) “confirmed that he met with tribal leaders in Montgomery and that
the $250 million number was ‘mentioned.’”); see also Mike Cason, State Leaders
Look to Poarch Creeks for Bailout as AG Tries to Shut Casinos, AL.COM (May 10,
2015,
7:41AM),
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/05/state_leaders_seek_bailout_fro.html
(the Poarch Band’s treasurer and governmental relations adviser, Robert McGhee,
said that although “[t]he $250 million is an amount that’s been discussed. . .[n]o
arrangement has been made on what that would entail.”).
127
Cason, supra note 126 (this recommendation was made in 2015 by Alabama’s
Republican Caucus in the State’s House of Representatives and was later endorsed
by the State’s Senate President Pro Tem Del Marsh).
128
Moon & Lyman, supra note 126.
124
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indicate that it could easily afford to pay the state the $250 million that was
brought up in discussions with state leaders.129 From 2008 to 2010, the Poarch
Band’s gaming revenues experienced the fastest growth rate among gaming
tribes in the United States.130 PCI Gaming—the tribally-owned entity tasked
with operating the tribe’s gaming facilities—reported in 2012 that it “reaped
$322 million in net earnings [that year alone], continuing a five-year
upswing.”131 The tribe itself reported that its gaming and hospitality operations
“generated as much as $600 million in revenues in 2012.”132 A vast majority of
these profits are derived from the tribe’s three casinos, while the tribe’s two
pari-mutuel gaming operations accounted for a less significant portion of the
tribe’s net earnings.133
The Poarch Band’s holdings are not restricted to its gaming operations, nor
are they restricted to investments within Alabama’s borders. “The Tribe has
acquired stakes in a string of Florida hotels. . .in Pensacola, Fort Walton Beach
and near Orlando,” and is presently developing a hotel in Huntsville, Alabama
(“with rights to build another”).134 On its tribal lands, the tribe has “opened a
manufacturing and fabrication company named Muskogee Technology; runs a
cattle farm, two gas stations and a truck stop; and owns Magnolia Branch
Wildlife Reserve that makes up about 9,000 acres and includes a tree farm, an
RV park and campground.”135 In 2015, the tribe gained full control over the
$200 million Blue Collar Country development—a 500 acre complex in Foley,

Id. (the Poarch Band’s treasurer and governmental relations adviser said in a
2015 interview with the Montgomery Advertiser that the Tribe had the means to
pay the state the $250,000,000 in exchange for exclusive gaming rights).
130
George Altman, Study: Alabama Indian Casino Revenue Growth Fastest in
Nation,
AL.COM
(Mar.
11,
2012,
7:20
AM),
http://blog.al.com/live/2012/03/study_alabama_indian_casino_re.html.
PCI’s
gaming revenues increased no less than 34 percent every year between 2008 and
2010, while total Indian gaming revenues in the United States as a whole “grew 1.2
percent in 2008, fell 1 percent in 2009 and grew 1.3 percent in 2010.” Id.
131
Michael Finch II, Flush With Cash, Poarch Creek Tribe’s Growing Interests
Stretch from Huntsville to Florida, AL.COM (Sept. 6, 2014, 8:00 AM),
http://www.al.com/business/index.ssf/2014/09/poarch_creek_tribes_growing_in.ht
ml. In 2008, PCI’s gaming revenues grew 45 percent, 34 percent in 2009, and 61
percent in 2010. Altman, supra note 130.
132
Finch, supra note 131.
133
See generally Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 15 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1168 (M.D.
Ala. 2014). See also Marc D. Anderson, Poarch Creeks Take Control of $200
Million Blue Collar Country Project in Foley, AL.COM (May 22, 2015, 6:10 PM),
http://www.al.com/news/mobile/index.ssf/2015/05/poarch_creeks_take_control_of.
html; The Poarch Band acquired the Mobile Greyhound Park and the Pensacola
Greyhound Track and Poker Room in 2009. See also Finch, supra note 131 (noting
financial audits submitted to the Florida Department of Business and Professional
Regulation suggested that “[i]n 2013, the Pensacola track and its 25 poker tables
earned about $125,000 in net income.”).
134
Finch, supra note 131.
135
Anderson, supra note 133.
129
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Alabama that will feature retail space, entertainment venues, restaurants,
amusement rides, a water park, an RV park, a 200 bedroom hotel, and a
convention space.136
1. Recommending Provisions to be Included in a Compact Between
Alabama and the Poarch Band
As demonstrated in an analysis of Florida’s tribal-state compact, states
have the authority to demand an enormous share of tribal gaming revenues in
exchange for promises of exclusivity. For Alabama, this means that the state
may be able to access a significant source of new revenue by entering into a
revenue-sharing agreement with the Poarch Band. If the state is to stake its
claim to a share of the Poarch Band’s gaming revenues, it must promise the
Poarch Band the exclusive right to conduct Class II or Class III gaming
operations in the state. In exchange for exclusive gaming rights, the state might
follow Florida’s regime of structured payments made to the state in accordance
with a revenue-sharing schedule. Of course, such an agreement may have an
adverse impact on other non-tribal gaming operations in the state.137
A tribal-state compact between Alabama and the Poach Band must also
create a regime where the Poarch Band’s independent regulatory entity must
answer to the state to ensure that tribal gaming is conducted in accordance with
tribal law, IGRA, and the proposed tribal-state compact. This may require the
state to create its own gaming commission or compliance agency that will work
in concert with the tribe’s already existing Tribal Gaming Commission.138 The
tribal-state compacts of Florida and Mississippi both establish a hierarchy
where a tribal independent regulatory agency provides the state with copies of
the tribal gaming commission’s investigations. However, both compacts differ
as to the extent to which the state may exercise direct oversight of tribal gaming
operations.
Alabama and the Poarch Band must also negotiate a method to reimburse
Id.
See ALA. CONST. amend. 508, 565, 506, 743, 569, 386, 692, 674, 744, 387, 440,
413, 599, 612, 542, 549.. (Alabama’s state constitution authorizes certain bingo
operations in Calhoun, Covington, Etowah, Greene, Houston, Jefferson, Limestone,
Lowndes, Macon, Madison, Mobile, Montgomery, Morgan, Russell, St. Clair, and
Walker counties).
138
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS, TRIBES & TRIBAL NATIONS CODE OF
ORDINANCES, Title 20, ch. 1, § 20–2–1 (2015), https://www.municode.com/
library/tribes_and_tribal_nations/poarch_band_of_creek_indians/codes/code_of_or
dinances?nodeId=TIT20GA (establishing the Poarch Band of Creek Indians Tribal
Gaming Commission “in order to regulate the operation, conduct, and playing of
Gaming Activities on the Tribe’s Indian Lands.”). See also id. at § 20–2–2. (The
Poarch Band’s Tribal Gaming Commission “[acts] independently and
autonomously from the Tribal council in all matters within its purview.”). See
generally id. at § 20–2–6 (delegating powers and duties to the Tribal Gaming
Commission).
136
137
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the state costs incurred in regulating and enforcing the terms of the tribal-state
compact. Such a provision will inevitably depend on the scope of the state’s
regulatory authority. If the state intends to utilize Mississippi’s ‘hands-off’
approach to regulation by delegating the primary authority to regulate tribal
gaming to the tribe, the state and the tribe may choose to agree to a budget that
splits regulation and enforcement costs between the tribe and the state.
Conversely, if the state intends to utilize Florida’s ‘hands-on’ approach and
adopt an active regulatory role, it might choose to require the tribe to reimburse
the state for its regulation and enforcement costs.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in PCI Gaming effectively forecloses the
possibility that Alabama might be able to regulate gaming operations on the
Poarch Band’s tribal lands in the absence of a tribal-state compact. Therefore,
the state must resume compact negotiations with the tribe if it is to have any
say in the conduct of tribal gaming in the state. Consistent with IGRA and
following the examples of compacts negotiated by Florida and Mississippi, a
tribal-state compact between Alabama and the Poarch Band should include: (1)
a definite term during which the compact will remain effective; (2) a provision
creating an Alabama State Gaming Commission or an Alabama State
Compliance Agency to ensure that gaming on tribal lands is conducted in
compliance with IGRA, Alabama state law, tribal law, and the tribal-state
compact; (3) definitions of what games the tribe can operate at its facilities; (4)
a provision allowing the parties to agree upon a budget to cover the state’s
regulation and enforcement costs; (5) a promise that the tribe can conduct
certain games exclusively; and (6) a revenue-sharing agreement in
consideration for the promise of exclusivity.
A tribal-state compact between the Alabama and the Poarch Band, if
negotiated in good faith, can ensure that the state can stake its claim to a share
of the tribe’s lucrative gaming operations. In a state plagued by budget crises,
tribal gaming revenues (if properly distributed) can provide the ‘stop-gap’
needed to restore much needed funding to state programs. While a tribal-state
compact does not grant the state the absolute authority it desires to regulate
tribal gaming, it does provide the state with limited regulatory authority as well
as an opportunity to benefit from the tribe’s immensely successful gaming
operations. In the absence of a tribal-state compact, the state will not be able to
regulate the conduct of tribal gaming occurring within its borders and will not
reap the benefits of the Poarch Band’s wildly successful gaming operations.

